Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3: Country Studies - Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey by Merih Celâsun & Dani Rodrik
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume
3: Country Studies - Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-30455-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/sach89-2
Conference Date: September 21-23, 1987
Publication Date: 1989
Chapter Title: Conclusions and Prospects
Chapter Author: Merih CelÃ¢sun, Dani Rodrik
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9066
Chapter pages in book: (p. 761 - 768)761  TurkeyKhapter 10 
a useful  financing function as its cost is still modest compared to domestic 
borrowing. 
A second and related issue has to do with the important role played by the 
central bank, and of the banking sector in general, in debt accumulation. The 
CTLDs of  the  1970s and  the  Dresdner  Bank  accounts  (as well  as various 
balance-of-payments  loans) of the 1980s have ultimately been the liability of 
the  central  bank.  The advantage  of  these  kinds  of  borrowing  is  that  they 
provide a degree of latitude in their use which project credits do not allow. 
But  this  may  also  be  a  disadvantage  to  the  extent  that  they  allow  a 
disjuncture between  decisions on debt accumulation  on the one hand, and 
decisions  on  resource  allocation  and  investment  patterns  on  the  other. 
Whether  this  is dangerous  or not  depends  on how  finely tuned the central 
bank is to the investment possibilities in the public and private sectors. These 
arrangements  have  an  additional  consequence:  they  tend  to  bias  the 
debt-servicing  process  toward  money  creation  rather  than  public  sector 
budget adjustments. 
9.5  Concluding Remarks 
This  chapter  has  focused  on Turkey’s  external  financial  relations  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  crisis  of  1977.  The importance of  the  support provided 
during this period  by  the international financial community  (mostly OECD 
governments  and  eventually  the  IMF  and  World  Bank)  cannot  be 
underestimated.  No other country  has  been  the  beneficiary  of  comparable 
amounts of financial assistance. We have argued here that the West’s concern 
with  the  Turkish  economy  was  at  heart  strategic;  as one  foreign  banker 
colorfully  put  it,  “supranational  agencies  such  as  the  IMF,  as  well  as 
Western governments,  showed little interest in Ankara’s  financial difficulties 
until Turkish real estate suddenly became more valuable to NAT0.”l7 
In  this  key  respect,  Turkey’s  adjustment  experience  is  likely  to  prove 
nontransferable. Of course, this qualification does not reduce the importance 
of the domestic policies undertaken since January  1980, nor does it diminish 
their relative success.  But it puts the experience into a proper perspective. 
10  Conclusions and Prospects 
In many  ways, the  Turkish  encounter  with foreign  debt has combined  the 
best and worst in the debt-management experience of the developing world. 
During the  1970s, Turkish policymakers got the country into a debt crisis by 
relying  on  an  intrinsically  destabilizing  form  of  foreign  borrowing,  and 762  Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik 
ensured  that  the  adjustment  to the  crisis  would  be  extremely  painful  by 
following policies that consistently discouraged exports. The tail end of  the 
decade  witnessed  a  typical  pattern  of  import  compression  and  inflation, 
spurred  by  the  authorities’  unwillingness  to  undertake serious  adjustment 
measures. The 1980s,  on the other hand, have been a period of recovery and 
regained  creditworthiness.  At the policymaking level,  the gains made since 
1980 can be  credited  in  large  part to  Turgut  Ozal,  who  as deputy  prime 
minister  pushed  for the  radical  adjustment  package  of  1980 and  who  as 
prime  minister  consolidated  the  outward  orientation  of  the  economy  after 
1983.  In this,  he was assisted both by the  special freedom provided to the 
technocrats  under  the  military  rule  of  1980-83 and  by  the  exceptionally 
generous official capital inflows stimulated by Turkey’s important geopoliti- 
cal role.  Without  these  two enabling  circumstances,  we  doubt  that  Ozal’s 
program could  have  been  carried  out to its  fruition.  This is  an  important 
cautionary note for those who believe that Turkey’s experience can be easily 
transplanted  in other contexts. 
A  convenient  way  to  summarize  some  of  our  arguments  in  previous 
chapters is via the perspective provided by  key  debt indicators.  Table  10.1 
displays the  trends  in debt/GNP, debuexports,  and debt-service  ratios over 
the 1973-86  period. A quick glance at the numbers for the mid-1970s  shows 
what was wrong with the debt strategy at the time.  By  1977 the debVGNP 
ratio had almost doubled to 27 percent  from  15 percent in  1973.  But this in 
itself was a rather undramatic rise, given the small initial base. What proved 
Table 10.1  Principal Debt Indicators, 1973-86  (in percentages) 

























































Sourcrs:  Central bank.  SPO 
=Debt is converted into  national  currency  by  using  period-average  exchange rates:  black  market  rates  for 
1974-79,  and official rates for 1973 and 1980-86. 
bExports refer to exports of goods and services. 
‘Ratio of interest payments, short-term debt (with less than one-year maturity), and amortization payments on 
medium- and long-term debt to exports of goods and services. 763  TurkeyKhapter 10 
disastrous in the end was a sharp deterioration between 1975 and 1977 in the 
ability to service the new liabilities: the debt-service ratio quadrupled in two 
years  from  70 percent  to  an  incredible 290  percent.  This  was  partly  the 
consequence of the anti-export bias of the growth policies of the period. But 
more importantly, it was the result of a debt strategy which, by  providing a 
blanket guarantee against exchange losses, encouraged the private sector to 
incur as many  short-term liabilities as possible, as quickly as possible. 
During the two-and-a-half years of  muddling through which followed the 
crisis, the economy came crashing down, inflation accelerated, and income 
distribution  worsened  considerably  as  unprotected  sectors  became  the 
casualty of the rise in prices. Yet  as table 10.1 shows, the debt-service ratio 
started  to  descend  quite  rapidly  from  its  peak  in  1977-78.  Before  the 
January  1980 reform package was announced, this ratio had already come 
down  to  155 percent,  and  fell further  to  102 percent in  1980 before the 
export  boom  had  gotten  under  way.  This  drastic  improvement  in  the 
economy’s ability to service its debt was of  course not the consequence of 
adjustment policies, which were quite lacking prior to  1980. The trick was 
performed  by  a  series of  debt reschedulings,  which reduced amortization 
payments substantially, and by  the conversion of  short-term liabilities into 
long-term  debt.  The  export  boom  starting  in  1981 took  another  40-50 
percent off the debt-service ratio, but this reduction looks rather unimpres- 
sive in comparison with the one accomplished by  debt renegotiations. 
To be sure, these debt renegotiations served only to postpone the servicing 
of the existing debt, Together with the new borrowing of the early 1980s, the 
reschedulings have now come back to haunt the Turkish economy, requiring 
ever-improving export  performance just  to  maintain the debt-service ratio 
level. In fact, as table 10.1 shows, the principal debt ratios have witnessed a 
marked worsening since 1982. The debt/GDP ratio now stands at an all-time 
high, and the debt-service ratio has inched its way up to around 100 percent. 
Both the debVGDP and debvexports  ratios are currently higher in  Turkey 
than they were in the heavily indebted Latin American countries just prior to 
their debt crisis (the Turkish debt-service ratio looks better, however).  This 
renders the balancing of exports, creditworthiness,  and sustained growth a 
very delicate high-wire act. 
In  a way,  the statistics overstate Turkey’s external debt.  A considerable 
share-amounting  to 16 percent at the end of  1986-of  the “foreign”  debt 
actually constitutes a liability to Turkish workers who reside abroad.2 But, 
accounting conventions aside, we do not think that this fact makes much of a 
difference in practice. It  would be  a mistake to consider these liabilities as 
“safer”  and more reliable than conventional forms of external indebtedness. 
As remittance behavior over the last two decades has shown, Turkish migrant 
workers are quite sensitive to overall macroeconomic conditions in Turkey. 
Hence,  they  are unlikely  to keep rolling over their deposits if  confidence 
wanes.  And  any  difficulty  in  servicing  these  foreign  currency  liabilities 
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How will Turkey manage the debt-service hump? Its debt burden could be 
eased  substantially by  another  round  of  reschedulings  or  by  refinancing 
existing liabilities and  converting  short-term  debt  into  longer term  debt. 
However,  the  current  global environment  is  not  particularly  encouraging 
about the prospects for this. Few  other countries have traveled as far down 
the adjustment path as has Turkey, and hence are as deserving of  favorable 
treatment. Ironically, this  very  fact makes  it  more  difficult for  Turkey to 
openly seek relief  hard-earned creditworthiness is at stake. Nonetheless, it is 
to  the  advantage  of  all  concerned-including  foreign  creditors  and 
multilateral  institutions-that  Turkey’s  model  prove  a  viable  one  in  the 
longer run.  For  this reason,  common  interest may  well  dictate that  some 
workable  arrangements  be  devised  for  reducing  Turkey’s  debt-service 
burden. It is scarcely fair that a “successful”  country should be servicing its 
rescheduled  debt  at  several  points  above  LIBOR  while  problem  debtor 
countries are rescheduling theirs at a margin less than 1 percent over LIBOR. 
Irrespective of  any rescheduling or refinancing, how Turkey comes out in 
the  short  to  medium  run  will  depend overwhelmingly on  two  aspects of 
economic performance: exports and fiscal balance. The continued servicing 
of  the  debt  will  require  both  generating  sufficient  foreign  exchange  and 
improving resource mobilization in the public sector, whose liability foreign 
debt primarily is. The dilemma is that many of the current policies appear to 
be working at cross purposes with respect to these two goals. 
10.1  Export Performance 
So far, Turkey’s export performance has confounded the export pessimists. 
The question that remains is the extent to which the export boom represents 
a genuine structural transformation and a permanent increase in  the econo- 
my’s capacity to generate foreign exchange. Questioning the permanence of 
a  boom  which  has  now  been  going  on  for  more  than  six  years  (with  a 
temporary-it  appears-setback  in 1986) may seem ungracious, yet we have 
pointed  out  at  several junctures  some  unsettling  aspects  of  the  export 
performance to date. We  reiterate two of  these here.  First, maintaining the 
export boom has required a continuous process of  real depreciation of  the 
Turkish currency and alongside it an explicit and generous program of export 
subsidization.  Neither  of  these  two,  continuous,  real  depreciations  and 
subsidies  is  a  policy  option  that  can  continue  to  be  exercised  without 
damaging consequences elsewhere. The subsidies themselves, even leaving 
aside the rather large overinvoicing to which they have given rise, are in clear 
contradiction of Turkey’s obligations under the GATT and will quite evidently 
attract restrictions on  market  access by  the leading importers as Turkey’s 
exports become more important. Subsidies are also costly to the budget; they 
therefore render public sector resource mobilization, the second desideratum 
alongside export performance, more problematic. 765  TurkeyKhapter 10 
As  to the policy of  real exchange rate depreciations, it is an impractical 
solution for the  longer run.  By  building a  real  interest rate  premium  on 
Turkish assets, a continuous and expected real depreciation raises the cost of 
capital and ultimately defeats the purpose of export expansion by  choking 
private investment in  tradables.  In  addition, just  like export  subsidies,  it 
increases  the  burden  of  debt  servicing  on  the  public  sector  budget: 
everything else being equal, a decrease in the real value of  the Turkish lira 
increases the debt-service/GNP ratio and requires a correspondingly smaller 
public  sector  deficit  (as  a  share  of  GNP)  to  finance  it.  Finally,  real 
depreciations are  ultimately  deleterious  to  distributional  goals.  While  in 
theory the link between the real exchange rate and real (consumption) wages 
is ambiguous, the Turkish experience suggests that in practice it is likely that 
currency depreciations have to be  validated by  real wage cuts  in order to 
yield the desired effect on competitiveness. From the social viewpoint, this 
is an  undesirable policy  given the magnitude of  real  wage cuts that  have 
already taken place. 
The  second aspect of  export  performance  we  want  to  highlight is  the 
evident absence of  private investment in  tradables that underlies it. So far, 
the export  boom  has come from existing capacity; there was considerable 
room  for  output expansion given  the  low  rates  of  capacity utilization  in 
1980. The continuation of the export drive clearly requires new  investment 
in  tradables. The government has pinned  its hopes on the private sector’s 
ability and willingness to provide the necessary capital accumulation. While 
private investment in manufactures has recovered somewhat from its trough 
in 1980-82,  it is still well below its level in 1976-77.  Disconcertingly (for 
exports), much of the recent increase in private investment has been geared 
toward housing. The overall sluggishness in investment performances is at 
least partly  related  to  the excessively high  real  rates of  interest currently 
prevailing. The latter in  turn is the consequence of the fact that the fiscal 
balance is still out of control (see be lo^).^ 
In sum, policy geared toward export promotion will have to start relying 
less on exchange rate and subsidy policies, and more on increases in private 
capital formation. A critical prerequisite, then, is to reduce the real cost of 
credit to the private sector, an  outcome that  can be  achieved only  if  the 
demands of the public sector on the economy’s resources can be moderated. 
10.2  Fiscal Balance 
As our argument above indicates, maintaining an appropriate fiscal stance 
is  not  only  important  for  generating  sufficient resources  with  which  to 
service the public sector’s debt, but is also crucial for avoiding the crowding 
out  of  private  investment in  export-oriented  sectors.  So far,  the  Turkish 
adjustment  experience  has  been  characterized  by  an  undistinguished 
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the  reforms  undertaken  since  1980  have  been  long  needed-e.g.,  the 
rationalization  of  public  sector prices,  adjustment of  tax  brackets  against 
inflation,  introduction  of  the VAT-the  overall retrenchment  in  the public 
sector deficit  has not  been  large, a  fact which finds its counterpart in  the 
continuing need for moderate amounts of  foreign borrowing. In many ways, 
the public sector balance remains the Achilles’ heel of the Turkish economy. 
A given public sector deficit can be financed in a noninflationary  manner 
in only one of  two ways: domestic or foreign borrowing. As we have pointed 
out  in  previous  chapters,  both  of  these  forms  of  borrowing  are  now 
extremely  costly.  Despite  its  newfound  creditworthiness,  the  amount  of 
voluntary  lending  flowing into Turkey  is not  substantial, and the Dresdner 
Bank accounts used  to draw  in  Turkish workers’ savings from abroad  pay 
substantial premia over Euromarket rates. Domestic borrowing, in which the 
government  liberally indulges, is even more costly,  at real rates of  interest 
far exceeding the growth rate of the public  sector’s revenue base. This last 
aspect, in particular,  raises serious questions about the sustainability  of  the 
current strategy. 
By all indications,  then, reducing  the public  sector deficit  is going to be 
the  main  challenge  to  policymakers  in  the  years  ahead.  Not  all  of  the 
adjustment here need be borne by public expenditures. A successful outcome 
would involve both decreased expenditures and expanded tax revenues. The 
experience  in  the  early  1980s  has  shown  the  difficulty  of  resource 
mobilization  via  taxation,  but  we  suspect  that  a  broader based  tax  effort 
aiming at, among other things, the enlarged profit margins in many services 
sectors has considerable promise. 
10.3  Income Distribution 
Improving the fiscal balance is likely to clash head on with an issue that 
we expect to become increasingly important over the next few years. As we 
have  highlighted  throughout  our  account,  the  Turkish  experience  with 
income distribution has been singularly disappointing ever since the onset of 
the debt crisis in mid-1977.  What makes this experience even more striking 
is that it took place after a period during the  1970s in which real wages and 
rural incomes had more than amply shared in the spoils of economic growth. 
As  the  political  system  opens  up,  a  process  which  by  and  large  was 
consolidated  with  the  referendum  of  September  1987,  we  expect  that 
distributional  issues  are  going  to  become  increasingly  important  in  the 
political agenda. 
An unavoidable question is the nature of the link between  the adjustment 
policies of  the 1980s and the adverse trends in distribution. The first point to 
be made in this connection is that, despite a widespread  impression  to the 
contrary,  the  deterioration  in  income distribution  started in  1978 and  had 
already  become  seriously  entrenched  by  the  time  the  1980 reforms were 767  TurkeyiChapter 10 
taking effect.  As  we  analyzed above, this initial sharp deterioration was a 
consequence of  the lack of  adjustment policies.  Inflation  triggered  by  the 
external constraint  and  the  shortages  wiped  out  the  real  incomes of  the 
least-protected  sectors  of  the  economy.  The  sad  irony  was  that  the 
half-hearted nature of the pre-1980 reforms was the result of  a concern that 
doing  more  might  have jeopardized  the  distributional  gains  of  previous 
years. 
It  is  true  nonetheless that  the  post-1980 policies  did  not  exactly  have 
salutary effects on  distribution either. Some of  the distributional trends at 
that time can be  linked to the military’s role in  freezing the factor shares 
inherited  in  late  1980.  It  is  also clear  that  distributional issues  were  of 
secondary importance to Ozal compared to economic recovery and regaining 
creditworthiness.  In  general,  theory  makes  no  predictions  about  the 
distributional consequences of  adjustment policies. But as we have stressed, 
the  very  nature  of  the  policies followed in  this  period,  relying on  sharp 
changes in economywide relative prices, ensured that the outcome would not 
be distributionally neutral. 
Take,  for  example,  real  wages.  The  reduction  in  real  wages  served  a 
number of important purposes in the adjustment process. First, it allowed an 
increase in competitiveness of  the traded sector. Secondly, it eased the cost 
pressures brought on by the high cost of credit in an already highly indebted 
private  manufacturing  sector. Third,  it  contributed to  the  improvement in 
public  sector finances by  reducing the wage  bill  of  state enterprises.  The 
deterioration  in  agriculture’s  term  of  trade  served  many  of  the  same 
purposes. The reduction in farm price supports and the phasing out of  input 
subsidies enhanced public sector savings. The emphasis on the subsidization 
of  manufactured exports,  on the other hand, denied agriculture most of  the 
gains  that  conventional analysis had  posited  would  follow  from  outward 
orientation. 
Was there an alternative? We  suspect that policies geared directly toward 
improving the distribution of  income would have complicated tremendously 
the  recovery  effort  in  the  chaotic  conditions  of  1980.  Yet  some  of  the 
post-1980 trends could  perhaps  have been  avoided  if  the  emphasis in the 
program had been less on relative prices and more on policies that reduced 
expenditures directly. In practice, what this means of course is that the scale 
of  public  sector expenditures, both  current and  investment, ought to have 
been more tightly controlled.  As  we  argued in  chapter 8, this would have 
been  somewhat costly in  terms of  growth, as public investment played an 
important stimulating role in the absence of private investment. In addition, 
we  know  very  little about  the distributional implications of  direct cuts  in 
government expenditures. Nonetheless, it is quite likely that such a change 
in the overall thrust of  the program  would  have eased the requirement of 
turning the terms of  trade of  workers and farmers sharply against them in 
order to generate savings for the public sector. 768  Merih Celisun and Dani Rodrik 
In addition, it  is possible that the real  interest rate  consequences of  the 
post- 1980 reforms could have been  moderated had  policymakers been  less 
dogmatically  attached  to  financial  and  capital  account  liberalization.  The 
latter reforms have not only necessitated a reorganization of factor shares at 
the  level  of  firms,  but  they  have  also  complicated  macroeconomic 
management by  engendering currency substitution. The relative openness of 
the  capital  account  has  rendered  speculative  attacks  and  capital  flight  a 
dangerous  possibility,  emphasizing  all  the  more  the  need  for  a  careful 
balance on the fiscal front. 
Appendixes 











Suleyman Demirel’s Justice Party (JP) government 
under increasing strain as political violence grows. 
The military present the president with a memoran- 
dum threatening a takeover. Demirel’s cabinet re- 
signs. Nihat Erim (Republican People’s Party, RPP) 
forms new government. 
Martial law proclaimed in eleven provinces. 
Erim resigns. 
Ferit Melen forms a coalition government. Biilent 
Ecevit takes over from Ismet Inonu as leader of the 
RPP. 
President Cevdet Sunay’s term expires. 
Fahri Koriiturk is elected president by  the Grand Na- 
tional Assembly, after repeated ballots fail to gener- 
ate enough support for the military’s favored candi- 
date, Faruk Gurler. Melen’s cabinet is succeeded by 
one formed by Naim Talu, an independent senator. 
Martial law comes to an end, as the military greatly 
reduce their interventionism of the past two years. 
General elections fail to produce a majority govern- 
ment, but Ecevit’s RPP emerges with a plurality of 
seats. 
RPP forms a coalition government with the Islamist 
National Salvation Party (NSP) led by  Necmettin Er- 
bakan. Ecevit becomes prime minister. 